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MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL-THE SUPREME
COURT AS MORAL PROPHET
Earl M. Maltz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Michael Perry has been one of the most ardent contemporary defenders of the exercise of noninterpretive judicial review. His writings
have consistently defended expansive readings of the due process and
equal protection clauses by defending decisions striking down abortion
laws' and various types of governmental discrimination against particular groups,' as well as by attacking the Court for its refusal to extend
those decisions.' The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights' is
by far his most ambitious work. In it, Perry attempts to provide a generalized justification for the refusal of the courts-and in particular the
Supreme Court-to feel bound by the intentions of the framers of the
Constitution.
Any such construct is, of course, liable to be highly controversial.
In the field of constitutional theory, the premises from which the various commentators proceed vary so widely that the achievement of consensus is likely to be impossible. But at the very least, any theory must
reach results consistent with the preconditions which the author himself
accepts as premises. On this level, Perry's argument is deeply flawed.
Thus, his model lacks viability.

II.

THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY

Like many contemporary constitutional theorists, Perry is concerned with the problem of the legitimacy of judicial review. He devotes his entire first chapter to "[tjhe problem of legitimacy."' Further,
in discussing his approach to noninterpretive review in so-called
"human rights" cases, he describes the stakes involved in the debate
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I. See Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976).
2. See. e.g.. Perry, Constitutional "Fairness":Notes on Equal Protectionand Due Process.
63 VA. L. REv. 383 (1977); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,70 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1979).
3. See, e.g.. Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role
in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978); Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory
of Racial Discrimination. 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
4.

M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

5.

Id. at 9.
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over the legitimacy of such review as "very high indeed." Thus, Perry
obviously views the question of legitimacy as being at the heart of the
debate over constitutional theory.
On one level, the focus on the concept of legitimacy is quite understandable, for the charge that a given theory of judicial review would
lead the courts to render decisions which are "illegitimate" has great
emotive impact. Indeed, unless one can defend his approach from a
charge of illegitimacy, there is little use in elaborating that theory further. For unless a legitimate role is posited for the Court, no amount of
argumentation regarding the "good" results engendered by the theory
will provide sufficient justification for its adoption.
But on another level, discussions of legitimacy per se can divert
attention from the issues which are truly raised by particular arguments. The source of the rhetorical force of a charge of illegitimacy is
the connotation that the theory at issue runs afoul of some transcendent political or moral principle. Unless one carefully identifies the
principles which are the basis of the charge of illegitimacy and directs
discussion specifically to those principles, the debate over "legitimacy"
can rapidly degenerate into an exchange of epithets.
In Perry's case, this difficulty is exacerbated by an inconsistency in
the identification of the principles underlying his conception of legitimacy. Initially, he seems to view consistency with the principle of electoral accountability as a necessary and sufficient condition for legitimacy in a theory of judicial review.7 Recognizing the inconsistency of
some exercises of interpretive review with the concept of electoral accountability, 8 however, Perry defends interpretive review in terms of
what he views as a "compelling functional justification." Finally, he
argues that the exercise of noninterpretive review in human rights cases
can only be viewed as legitimate if it is both justified functionally and

6. Id. at 92.
7. M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 9-10.
8. See id. at 12.
9. Id. at 15.
It should be noted that this "compelling" justification rests on rather shaky ground. Perry's
major premise is that "the judiciary is that branch of the federal government with the greatest
institutional capacity to enforce the legal norms of the Constitution in a disinterested way." Id. at
15-16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). He describes this assertion as "[unlcontroversial." Id.
at 16.
But if the course of judicial decision making from Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857) through Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) makes anything clear, it is that judges will be swayed by political bias-just as are members of other branches of government. Of course, the biases of federal judges are likely to be
somewhat different from those of congressmen or the President; but to suggest that the former will
act "in a disinterested way" is rather naive.
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consistent with the principle of electoral accountability."
Despite this apparent confusion, the basic thrust of Perry's criticism of the interpretivist position and his defense of noninterpretive review in human rights cases emerges rather clearly. Interpretivism he
finds unacceptable because he views it as being grounded on a theory of
moral skepticism." His defense of noninterpretive review, on the other
hand, is based on three major points: (a) noninterpretive review in
human rights cases has, on the whole, been an instrument for moral
growth in the United States; (b) noninterpretive review is extraconstitutional rather than contraconstitutional; and (c) the exercise of
noninterpretive review by the Supreme Court is consistent with the basic principle of electoral accountability. The remainder of this review
will focus on each of these points in turn.
III.

THE EFFICACY OF NONINTERPRETIVE REVIEW

One of the key points in Perry's argument is his contention that
noninterpretive review by the Supreme Court has, on balance, been an
instrument of moral growth for the country. Perry does not claim that
a refusal to exercise noninterpretive review would constitute illegitimate judicial behavior; instead, he rests his position on the proposition
that interpretivism is not the only legitimate judicial philosophy, and
that, in practical terms, the nation has benefited from the abandonment
of the framers' intent. If the latter contention is incorrect-if in fact
the exercise of noninterpretive review has not resulted in an overall
benefit to society-then there would be little point in developing a theory to justify the exercise of such review.
In assessing the overall performance of the Court, Perry attempts
to devalue those examples which are most damaging to his thesis. He
argues that because the debate over judicial review should focus on the
appropriate role to be played by the Court in contemporary American
society, cases such as Lochner v. New York" and Dred Scott v. Sanford 3 should be given less weight than Brown v. Board of Education4
and Griswold v. Connecticut' in assessing the performance of the federal judiciary.' It is by concentrating on the decisions which the Court
has rendered since Brown that Perry is able to conclude that noninterpretive review "has functioned, on balance, as an instrument of deepen-

10.
i.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 92-93.
Id. at 105.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 116-17.
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ing moral insight and of moral growth. '1 7
The difficulty with this argument is that the association of
noninterpretive review with the center/left political philosophy which
Perry associates with "moral growth" is not the product of any enduring structural feature of American government. Depending largely on
the shape of presidential politics, judicial activism could once again
easily become associated with the political theories which produced the
Lochner era.1 8 Therefore, rather than relegating Lochner and its progeny to a secondary role in the discussion, any consideration of the consequences of abandoning interpretivism must take fully into account
the possibility that judges will once more feel the urge to impose laissez-faire capitalism under the guise of constitutional interpretation.
Of course, the existence of this methodological flaw does not disprove Perry's assertion that noninterpretive review has been an instrument for moral growth. The question of the ultimate vitality of this
conclusion is an extraordinarily complex issue-too complex to be resolved or even intelligibly discussed in the context of a book review. But
in any event, under Perry's theory efficacy alone is insufficient to establish the legitimacy of such review. Parts III and IV will examine other
crucial elements of his argument.
IV.

THE EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL-CONTRACONSTITUTIONAL
DICHOTOMY

Perry's eagerness to avoid the claim that his theory countenances
contraconstitutional review is understandable. In common with American society generally, Perry sees the Constitution as identifying values
which are to be given a very high level of priority. Any theory which is
contraconstitutional by definition attempts to subordinate these values,
and is, therefore, subject to an extraordinarily heavy burden of justification. By contrast, the advocate of a theory of judicial review which is
only extraconstitutional faces a less severe problem in establishing the
legitimacy of his approach.
Unfortunately for Perry, the contraconstitutional/extraconstitutional distinction rests upon an unduly narrow view of the function of
the Constitution itself. Most of the Constitution is not directly concerned with the establishment of "human rights" at all; rather, much
of the document is devoted to the description of the structure of government and to the definition ofrthe powers of various branches. These
structural provisions are concerned with two basic issues-the distribu-

17. Id. at l18.
18. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Congress cannot impose
minimum wage requirement for state employment).
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tion of authority between the state and federal governments, and the
allocation of federal power between the various branches of the central
government. By determining the allocation of power, the provisions implicitly define the appropriate role of the Court in review of state and
federal actions, respectively. In both cases, the relevant provisions indicate that the Court should not strike down governmental action unless
directed to do so by the framers' intent.
With respect to judicial review of state action, the limitations on
judicial review are quite clear. The Constitution nowhere enumerates
the power of the states; instead, certain limitations are imposed, and all
other powers are explicitly reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. Since in the exercise of noninterpretive review the Supreme
Court-a branch of the federal government-limits the powers of the
states in a manner not contemplated by the Constitution, the exercise
of such review must violate this amendment.
No such explicit provision governs the relationship between the
Court and Congress. However, the Constitution does make a clear distinction between those powers granted by Congress by Article I, section
8, and those granted to the courts in Article III. Further, the Article I
powers are plainly intended to be plenary, limited only by extrinsic provisions within the Constitution itself. Thus, when the Court imposes
restrictions based upon values not derived from the Constitution-in
other words, exercises the power of noninterpretive review-the justices
violate the principles of separation of powers which are implicit in Articles I and III.
One might attempt to meet these arguments by conceding the
technically contraconstitutional nature of noninterpretive judicial review, but contending that the need for protection of individual rights
somehow outweighs the structural concerns inherent in the Constitution.19 The difficulty with this position is that arguments based on
structure in fact implicate the interests of individuals. Committee for
Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist20 provides a clear

illustration of this point. Nyquist dealt with a New York statute which
provided for a number of different types of assistance to nonpublic
schools. Those schools whose student bodies included a high percentage
of low income families received direct monetary grants for maintenance
and repair. In addition, low and moderate income families whose chil-

19. Perry does not explicitly make this argument in the context of his discussion of the
extraconstitutional/contraconstitutional distinction. However, in his discussion of judicial review
of matters of allocation of authority between the state and federal governments, he explicitly
rejects the claim that "federalism issues are, at bottom, human rights issues of one sort or another." M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 45 n.*.
20. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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dren attended nonpublic schools were entitled to both tuition reimbursement from the state and a graduated tax credit. Because the aid
benefited church-sponsored schools, the Court found that all portions of
the New York statute violated the first amendment prohibition on the
establishment of religion.
Certainly, one cannot imagine a more personal interest than the
right which in Nyquist was denied by the Court to the erstwhile beneficiaries of the New York program-the right to receive money. Further,
at least in the absence of a federal statute, once the right to receive
funds had been established by legitimate state processes, the tenth
amendment forbids federal judicial interference in the absence of some
extrinsic constitutional command. Thus, if Perry is correct in his assertion that the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to
incorporate the bill of rights,"1 then Nyquist emerges as a classic case
of contraconstitutional action-the denial of an individual right in contravention of a constitutional prohibition.
Nyquist is in some respects rather unusual. In most human rights
cases, the specific individuals whose interests are endangered by judicial activism will be less easily identified. Those interests, however, still
exist; they are less apparent only by virtue of being more diffuse than
those which were at issue in Nyquist. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego2 illustrates this point. Metromedia involved a constitutional
challenge to a city ordinance which limited the use of billboards to narrowly defined circumstances. Invoking the first amendment, a sharplydivided Court found the ordinance unconstitutional.
On its face, unlike Nyquist, the negative effect of the Metromedia
decision on individual interests is not obvious. That effect is nonetheless
quite real. The primary motivation for the imposition of restrictions
such as that in Metromedia is simply that a large portion of the citizenry does not wish to be exposed to billboards; in essence, the ordinance established their right not to be so exposed. Further, as in Nyquist, the judicial abrogation of this right plainly violates the tenth
amendment. Thus, once again, judicial exclusion under the first amendment resulted in a contraconstitutional denial of individual rights.
Notwithstanding the difficulty in maintaining the extraconstitutional/contraconstitutional distinction, the heart of Perry's theory
might yet survive, for he seems to suggest that even if contraconstitutional, noninterpretive review might be legitimate if consistent with the
principle of electoral accountability.' 3 The next subpart will examine

21.
22.
23.

M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 61-64.
453 U.S. 490 (1981).
M. PERRY, supra note 4, at ix.
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Perry's claim that his theory is consistent with this principle.
ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND NONINTERPRETIVE REVIEW

V.

Perry attempts to reconcile noninterpretive review with the principle of electoral accountability by positing an unlimited congressional
power to control the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 4 As conceptualized by Perry, withdrawal of jurisdiction over a particular type of
issue would essentially overrule previous decisions of the Court on that
issue.2 5 Since the potential exercise of this power leaves ultimate control in the legislative branch of government, Perry concludes that
noninterpretive review is consistent with the axiom that authority
should rest with officials who are accountable to the citizenry.
In the abstract, the existence of such a congressional power might
seem to inject a significant degree of electoral accountability into the
process of noninterpretive judicial review. However, one is not dealing
with an abstract system; rather, constitutional theorists are faced with
a system which has had considerable experience with attempts to use
the jurisdiction-limiting power as a check on the authority of the federal courts. And in fact, the authority of Congress over the jurisdiction
of the federal courts has been virtually no check at all on judicial
power. In the entire history of the United States, there is only one instance in which the jurisdiction-limiting power has been used to effectively prevent the Supreme Court from making an authoritative announcement on an issue of grave public importance." Even in that
case, the effect of the imposition of the limitation was only to delay the
exercise of judicial authority. 7 Indeed, if one is evaluating the various
checks on the Supreme Court's power, the amendment process has
been far more effective as a means of controlling the judiciary; constitutional amendments have been adopted to overrule Supreme Court decisions in four instances.2 8 Yet, Perry specifically rejects the proposition
a significant pothat the existence of the amendment process provides
9
litical check on the exericse of judicial authority.
In attempting to defuse this criticism, Perry might resort to two
24.

Id. at 128.

25. See id. at 130-31.
26. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
27. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). See generally 6 C. FAIRMAN, His-.
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 433-514 (1971).

28. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) was overruled in part by the twenty-sixth
amendment; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) was overruled by the
sixteenth amendment; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) was overruled by the
fourteenth amendment; and Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793) was overruled by
the eleventh amendment.
29. M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 127.
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devices. First, he could (and does) argue that so long as the jurisdiction-limiting power exists, the mere fact that the polity and its representatives have chosen not to use the authority should not be fatal to
this theory.30 But one must always remember that Perry is seeking to
justify judicial review in functional terms-that is, in terms of the
practical operation of the system-and in practical terms, the theoretical existence of an unlimited congressional jurisidiction-limiting power
has not made the Supreme Court electorally accountable in any sense.
Nor can it be effectively argued that the failure of Congress to
directly overrule noninterpretive decisions of the Supreme Court is
founded in its agreement with the moral principles underlying those
decisions.3 1 One need only observe the course of congressional debate
over such matters as school prayer, abortion and the death penalty to
realize that legislators do not feel free to vote their convictions in the
face of contrary Supreme Court precedents. Instead, such precedents
seem to be viewed as cloaked in a kind of mystical authority which
constrains the political process rather than becoming ultimately subject
to it.
Thus, Perry cannot effectively argue that, in the exercise of
noninterpretive review, the Supreme Court is significantly constrained
by the actions of the other electorally-accountable branches of government. This lack of an effective political check also has profound implications for another concept at the core of Perry's functional argument-that noninterpretive review enriches and focuses the moral
dialogue which influences policy choices.3 2 Perry is clearly correct in
his assertion that the Court will at times be well-placed institutionally
to participate in such a dialogue with the legislative and executive
branches of government. Such a dialogue occurs when the Court is formulating common law or interpreting statutes; in such cases, the
electorally accountable branches feel free to modify judicial decisions if
necessary. But where the Court strikes down governmental action on
constitutional grounds, moral dialogue is often (although not invariably) discouraged and inhibited.
The abortion decisions provide a classic example. Prior to the
Court's holding in Roe v. Wade,3 3 American society was in the midst of
a fundamental reevaluation of its position toward the legality of abortion. Through the legislative process of exchange of views and compromise, state laws were being reformed, with a gradual but perceptible

30. See id. at 127-29.
31. Perry may be relying on this argument as well. See id. at 132.
32. See id. at I15.
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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drift toward liberalization.' Roe effectively ended this process of discourse and compromise. In the absence of a constitutional amendment,
the standards set out in Roe have been viewed by all concerned as the
unalterable base from which further debate must proceed. Further, action by the Court has had a polarizing effect; the debate over the issues
left undecided by Roe has become dominated by the extremes on both
the pro-life and pro-choice sides of the argument, with the legislative
process captured by those who would prohibit or hinder abortions in
every conceivable way which might be permitted by Roe. The result is
that rather than being a simple participant in the ongoing moral debate
over abortion laws, the Court has become the ultimate authority on the
subject, issuing ex cathedra pronouncements which are the final word
on each restriction imposed by other governmental bodies.
In short, the exercise of noninterpretive review defeats the. very
purpose which Perry sees as the rationale for the practice. Rather than
enriching the debate over controversial social/moral issues, the extension of "constitutional" judicial authority often tends to truncate and
stifle that debate.35 Thus, his functional justification for the rejection of
interpretivism is ultimately unconvincing.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The unpersuasiveness of Perry's arguments derives from his unwillingness to face a simple, unalterable fact-that except within relatively narrow parameters, the exercise of judicial review is fundamentally inconsistent with the theory of electorally accountable
government. 8 ' This fact does not necessarily condemn the practice; one
can still argue that the abandonment of democratic principles leads to
a better governed nation. But unless one is willing to forthrightly take
this position, any defense of noninterpretive review is doomed to
failure.

34. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down recently liberalized abortion law).
35. This problem is admittedly less severe in cases where the courts become deeply involved
in ongoing institutional reform. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 146-62. In such cases,,
the exigencies of the situation require judges to engage in the kind of dialogue envisioned by
Perry. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1979). But such cases make up only a small percentage of those in which the federal
courts have engaged in noninterpretive review.
36. In rare cases--those involving voting rights and reapportionment, for example-the exercise of judicial review might be seen as actually perfecting the democratic process. See generally
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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